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Abstract
The present paper proposes to provide a framework in which both 
theoretical and empirical studies of apologizing are reanalyzed, 
while different aspects of the act of apologizing are clarified. First, 
how each discipline or sub-discipline of the studies of apologies 
conceptualizes the act of apologizing is explained, and what aspect 
each tries to capture is discussed. Then a framework of speech 
acts is presented, in which different conceptions of apologies 
are properly placed and their relationships are clearly specified. 
Finally, politeness, gender, and cross-cultural diversities are 
discussed within the proposed framework.
Key words: apologies, illocutionary acts, remedial moves, politeness, 
gender
The research into apologies as a speech act cuts across 
different disciplines and sub-disciplines of language studies 
such as philosophy of language, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, 
and ethnomethodology. Owing to this interdisciplinary nature, 
researchers do not share a theoretical framework that defines 
the act of apologizing, or that specifies how related issues like 
politeness, gender, and cross-cultural diversities should be included 
in the discussion. However, for the same reason, it has been a rich 
and promising area where analytical studies and empirical studies 
co-exist and benefit each other, and contribute to the clarification 
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of the conception of apologies as well as their linguistic and social 
functions.
 The goal of the present paper is to provide a framework for 
analyzing apologies as illocutionary and social acts. In doing so, 
theoretical and empirical studies of apologizing are explained 
and reanalyzed, and different aspects of the act of apologizing 
are clarified. First the definitions of apologies provided by 
different disciplines or sub-disciplines are introduced, and how 
each conceptualizes the act of apologizing and what aspect each 
tries to capture are explained. Then a theoretical framework of 
illocutionary acts is presented, and social aspects of apologies and 
cross-cultural diversities of the act of apologizing are explained 
within the framework. Finally, politeness and gender issues are 
explained very briefly as the issues of the social relation between 
the speaker and the hearer, which is specified or indicated by the 
social relation between the addresser and the addressee.  
1. Definitions of the act of apologizing
1.1 Speech act theory
The definition of apologies depends on the research discipline 
within which they are analyzed. In speech act theory, the act of 
apologizing is classified as a behabitive by Austin (1962), and as 
an expressive by Searle (1979).  However, the question is not about 
which category the act of apologizing is, or should be, classified 
into, but how the classifications of illocutionary acts are made, and 
how the act of apologizing is classified accordingly. In this section, 
Austin's and Searle's classifications of illocutionary forces/acts are 
given, and the discussions of the aspects of the illocutionary act/
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force clarified by the classifications follow.
1.1.1 J. L. Austin (1962)
Austin distinguishes five general classes of illocutionary acts: 
verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives 
(151-164), although he does not explain the criteria by which 
these classes of illocutionary acts are distinguished. The 
classification is presented in the process of developing the concept 
of performatives, which contrast with constatives, into that of 
illocutionary acts/forces within the general theory of speech acts, 
where a list of illocutionary forces/acts of utterances, rather than 
that of “explicit performative verbs”, is necessitated (149-150). 
Austin himself acknowledges that the classification is general and 
preliminary, and he is not equally happy about these classes (150). 
He says, for example, the class of behabitives, to which the act of 
apologizing belongs, is troublesome because it is “miscellaneous” 
(152). Accordingly Austin's classification of illocutionary force 
should be interpreted as an attempt to describe different types of 
illocutionary force of an utterance, which can be made explicit 
by performatives, and the classification gives a general picture of 
illocutionary acts the speaker can perform in uttering something.  
 The five classes of illocutionary force of an utterance are 
explained by Austin as follows:
(1) Verdictives consist in the delivering of a finding, official 
or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact, 
as far as these are distinguishable (152). 
(2) An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of or 
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against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it (155). 
(3) The whole point of a commissive is to commit the speaker 
to a certain course of action (155). 
(4) Behabitives include the notion of reaction to other people's 
behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions 
of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent 
conduct (160). 
(5) Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the 
expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and 
the clarifying of usages and of references (161).
The illocutionary act of apologizing, which is our present concern, 
is included in the class of behabitives, and the acts in this class 
are described as reacting, or assuming or expressing attitudes, 
and distinguished from acts of delivering a fact, giving a decision, 
committing oneself to a certain action, and making expositions. 
The examples of behabitives include thanks, sympathy, attitudes, 
greetings, wishes, and challenging, as well as apologies, and they 
are made explicit by performative verbs, “thank”, “deplore”, “resent”, 
“welcome”, “bless”, “dare”, and “apologize” (150, 160).
 Austin specifically mentions the act of apologizing in the 
explanation of the relationships between behabitives and other 
classes, i.e., verdictives and commissives. He says the verdictive 
utterance “I blame myself” has an illocutionary force similar to 
that of the behabitive utterance “I apologize”: “… in one sense of 
‘blame' which is equivalent to ‘hold responsible', to blame is a 
verdictive, but in another sense it is to adopt an attitude towards 
a person, and it is thus a behabitive” (155). The utterance “I 
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apologize” can be a commissive, and the speaker commits herself 1 
to avoiding the conduct she apologizes for (155).
 Austin also explains how the illocutionary force of apologizing 
is made explicit.  Although the utterance “I apologize” makes the 
illocutionary force/act of apologizing explicit, “I am sorry” is not a 
pure performative but a half descriptive (79), and the utterance “I 
am sorry to have to say …” has nothing to do with performatives 
but is a “polite phrase” (81).
 Within Austin's classification of illocutionary forces/acts, the 
act of apologizing is explained as a behabitive type, which is to 
react, or assume or express attitudes. More specifically, it is the 
speaker's act of reacting to her past conduct, and assuming or 
expressing the attitude of regret for it, while committing herself to 
avoiding the conduct. While the illocutionary force of apologizing 
can be made explicit by the performative utterance “I apologize”, 
and the illocutionary act of apologizing is performed, the utterance “I 
am sorry” describes the attitude of regret the speaker expresses or 
assumes, which does not necessarily express or assume the attitude 
of apologizing.
1.1.2 John R. Searle (1969, 1979)
Searle seems to have a different goal of classifying illocutionary 
forces/acts: it is to specify each illocutionary force/act in 
comparing it with others on the basis of clear principles. Searle, 
therefore, criticizes Austin's classification by saying “there is no 
clear principle of classification”, “there is a great deal of overlap 
from one category to another and a great deal of heterogeneity 
within some of the categories”, and “a very large number of verbs 
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find themselves smack in the middle of two competing categories” 
(Searle 1979: 10). 
 In Searle (1969: 54-55), a set of rules for the use of an 
illocutionary-force indicating devices is specified to explicate 
notions of illocutionary acts, and formulate their rules. Searle uses 
four rules, the propositional content rule, the preparatory rule, the 
sincerity rule, and the essential rule, by which the notion of each 
illocutionary act is clarified (57-64). 
 The notion of the illocutionary act of apologizing is specified 
by a set of rules for the use of the illocutionary-force indicating 
device of “I apologize”2. The propositional content rule for the 
illocutionary act of apologizing specifies, as its propositional 
content, past act A done by speaker S. The preparatory rule 
specifies, as its precondition, hearer H suffers from A, and S 
believes H suffers from A. The sincerity condition specifies, as the 
speaker's feeling, S regrets doing A. The essential rule specifies, 
as its illocutionary effect, the act is counted as an expression 
of S's regret for doing A. In other words, the illocutionary-force 
indicating device of “I apologize” is felicitously used when (i) 
there is a past act, which was done by the speaker, (ii) the hearer 
suffered/suffers from the act, and the speaker believes the hearer 
suffered/suffers from the act, and (iii) the speaker regrets for doing 
the act.  Under these circumstances, the utterance “I apologize” is 
counted as an expression of the speaker's regret for the act. That 
is, these four rules explain the structure of the illocutionary act: 
the illocutionary act is structured by (i) the state of affairs the 
act is about, which is specified by the propositional content rule, 
(ii) the circumstances under which the act is performed, which is 
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specified by the preparatory rule, (iii) the feelings/beliefs of the 
speaker, which is specified by the sincerity rule, and (iv) the effect 
of the illocutionary act, which is specified by the essential rule.
 In Searle (1979), the criteria for illocutionary acts are 
developed, and a new classification of illocutionary acts is 
provided. While replacing the concept of essential conditions by 
illocutionary points, Searle adds, to those specified by the four 
rules/conditions, the criteria including (i) directions of fit (the 
words-to-world direction of fit, or the world-to-words direction of 
fit), (ii) the degree of strength/commitment, and (iii) the relation 
to the rest of the discourse (2-8). On the basis of the developed 
criteria, Searle provides a list of basic categories of illocutionary 
acts: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and 
declarations. Brief descriptions of these categories are as follows:
(1) Assertives: the point or purpose of assertives is to commit 
the speaker to something's being the case, to the truth of 
the expressed proposition. The direction of fit is words-to-
world; the psychological state expressed is belief (that p) (12).
(2) Directives: the illocutionary point of directives consists 
in the fact that they are attempts by the speaker to 
get the hearer to do something. The direction of fit is 
world-to-words and the sincerity condition is want. The 
propositional content is that the hearer does some future 
action (13-14). 
(3) Commissives: the illocutionary point of commissives is to 
commit the speaker herself to some future course of action. 
The direction of fit is world-to-words, and the sincerity 
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condition is intention. The propositional content is that the 
speaker does some future action (14).
(4) Expressives: the illocutionary point of expressives is to 
express the psychological state specified in the sincerity 
condition about the state of affairs specified in the 
propositional content. There is no direction of fit, and the 
propositional content ascribes some property to either the 
speaker or the hearer (15-16). 
(5) Declarations: the successful performance of declarations 
brings about the correspondence between the propositional 
content and reality. The direction of fit is both words-to-
world, and world-to-words. There is no sincerity condition 
(16-19).
Concerning the category of expressives, to which the illocutionary 
act of apologizing belongs, Searle says “in performing an 
expressive, the speaker is neither trying to get the world to match 
the words nor the words to match the world, rather the truth of 
expressed proposition is presupposed” (15).
 As for the direction of fit, Recanati (1987: 155-156) claims, 
since the notion of direction of fit applies only to illocutionary 
acts which have a “referential” dimension, the first thing to do 
is distinguish acts that are essentially “content-conveying” from 
those that are not. He says illocutionary acts in the category 
of expressives is not content-conveying, and “the speaker 
conventionally expresses certain social attitudes vis-a¥-vis the 
hearer” (156).
 Within Searle's classification of illocutionary forces/acts, the 
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act of apologizing is explained as an expressive type, which is to 
express a psychological state. More specifically, it is the speaker's 
act of expressing her regret for doing a past act, which, she 
believes, the hearer suffered/suffers from. 
1.1.3 Apologies as an illocutionary act
What is it to perform an illocutionary act of apologizing? In other 
words, what aspects of apologies are revealed by describing them 
as illocutionary acts? Austin (1962) tries to explain what makes 
an utterance as an apology: it is essentially reacting to one's past 
conduct, and assuming or expressing the attitude of regret for it, 
while committing oneself to avoiding the conduct in the future. 
Searle (1969, 1979), on the other hand, tries to answer the question 
in describing how the act of apologizing differs from other types 
of illocutionary act: the act of apologizing is to express one's regret 
for a past act, which, she believes, the hearer suffered/suffers from; 
it is distinguished from other illocutionary acts by the criteria 
based on the four rules/conditions, the directions of fit, and 
others. In this sense, Searle's analysis of the illocutionary act of 
apologizing and other acts is systematic. What Searle fails to see, 
however, is that to explain differences among illocutionary acts is 
not to explain what it is to perform an illocutionary act3.
 Searle could rebut this point by saying that to perform, for 
example, an illocutionary act of apologizing is to say something 
with an intention of apologizing. However, since the speaker's 
intention works as an explanatory apparatus in Searle's intention-
based speech act theory, such an explanation would be circular. 
In saying that the speaker performs an illocutionary act of 
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apologizing when she utters “I'm really sorry. This won't happen 
again” with the intention of apologizing for her past conduct, 
we explain neither the intention of apologizing in terms of the 
illocutionary act of apologizing, nor the illocutionary act of apologizing 
in terms of the intention of apologizing: the illocutionary act is 
simply explained as, or even reduced to, the speaker's intention. A 
similar point is made in Gauker (2007: 129).
 In other words, the explication of the normative, rule-
governed character of illocutionary acts does not contribute to 
the explanation of what the illocutionary act is, and how it is 
performed. As Alston (2000: 105) points out, the fact that the 
speaker expresses some attitude as an illocutionary act does not 
make the utterance an illocutionary act of the sort. For example, 
when a trickster deceives somebody, and says “Sorry”while 
grinning, it is not apologizing, even though a feeling of slight 
regret might be involved in the utterance.
 What is missing in the speech act theory is the explanation of 
what makes an utterance a certain illocutionary act. Austin (1962) 
does not explain it clearly. The speaker's intention in Searle's (1969, 
1979) sense does not explain how an utterance becomes a certain 
illocutionary act. As is observed in communication in daily life, the 
speaker's intention of performing an act of apologizing does not 
guarantee the success of the illocutionary act of apologizing: the 
hearer might be too angry to accept the utterance as an apology, 
or the offence may be so serious and damaging that the utterance 
of “I'm sorry” is simply not good enough to be an illocutionary act 
of apologizing. Sociolinguists and pragmatists may have a better 
explanation of apologies, as is shown in the following.
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1. 2 Pragmatics and sociolinguistics
The definitions of apologies in pragmatics and sociolinguistics 
are generally based on Goffman's (1971) definition as “remedial 
work” (Fraser 1981, Owen 1983, Leech 1983, Holmes 1990b). In the 
following, Goffman's concept of remedial work is introduced, and 
the aspects of apologies revealed by regarding them as remedial 
work are explained. Then a more “pragmatic” definition given by 
Leech (1983) is discussed. 
1.2.1 Erving Goffman (1971, 1981)
The function of the remedial work is “to change the meaning that 
otherwise might be given to an act, transforming what could be 
seen as offensive into what can be seen as acceptable” (Goffman 
1971: 109). Goffman then explains apologies as remedial work in 
saying “an apology is a gesture through which an individual splits 
himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offence and 
the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief 
in the offended rule” (1971: 113). What Goffman's definition makes 
clear is that apologies are acts/moves whose meaning/value resides 
in the interaction between the speaker and the hearer. That is, 
unlike Searle's idea that the illocutionary value of the utterance 
is judged by the speaker's intention, acts in Goffman's sense are 
judged or recognized in an on-going discourse. When the speaker 
recognizes her utterance as an act of apologizing, that is, she utters 
it as an act of apologizing, she sees herself as an apologizer, who 
has a part as an offender, and another part as one who recognizes 
the offence and regrets it, and, therefore, affirms a belief in the 
offended social rule. This analysis can be extended to the hearer. 
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When the speaker recognizes the utterance as an act of apologizing 
to the hearer, she sees the hearer as a victim of the offence and 
also as the one who is reassured about the unjustifiability of the 
offence, and, therefore, about the validity of the offended rule. 
When the hearer accepts the utterance as an act of apologizing, he 
accepts to see the speaker as an apologizer and himself as the one 
apologized to.
 Goffman's (1971) analysis indicates the complexity of the 
concept of speaker and hearer. When the speaker recognizes her 
utterance as an act of apologizing, she recognizes herself as an 
apologizer, who made an offence and regrets it. Then the speaker 
can be theoretically distinguished from the addresser as an 
apologizer: in apologizing, the speaker assumes the responsibility 
of the addresser as an apologizer. The speaker recognizes the 
hearer as one apologized to, who was a victim of the offence and 
is reassured about the unjustifiability of the offence. The hearer 
can then be theoretically distinguished from the addressee as 
one apologized to. In Goffman (1981) the concepts of speaker 
and hearer are developed in a different direction: the concept of 
speaker is divided into those of animator, author, and principal. In 
section 2, we continue to discuss this issue.
1.2.2 Geoffrey Leech (1983)
 Leech's (1983) definition/description of apologies is influenced 
by Goffman's concept of remedial work, and he also inherits, from 
Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1979), the characterization of the 
act of apologizing as a behabitive/expressive. Leech says “Apologies 
express regret for some offence committed by s against h …. 
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Nevertheless an apology implies a transaction, in that it is a bid to 
change the balance-sheet of the relation between s against h. If the 
apology is successful, it will result in h's pardoning or excusing 
the offence” (1983: 124-25). Leech characterizes apologies as an act 
of expressing regret, like Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1979), 
where some offence committed by the speaker against the hearer is 
presupposed, as in Searle (1979). Like Goffman (1971), Leech also 
describes apologies in the on-going discourse between the speaker 
and the hearer, and specifically emphasizes a transition, which is a 
change from the state in which the speaker offended the hearer to 
the state in which the speaker is forgiven by the hearer about the 
offence.
 In Goffman's (1971) and Leech's (1983) analyses, social aspects 
of apologies are clarified. Apologies are the speaker's social acts to 
the hearer, where the speaker regards herself as an apologizer and 
the hearer as one apologized to, and tries to make her past offence 
forgiven by the hearer as a victim of the offence, by expressing 
regret for it. It is, however, still not clear how saying a few words, 
such as “I'm sorry” or “I apologize”, in an appropriate situation is 
do this type of social act.
1.3 Apologies as an illocutionary act and a social act
As is the case with Leech (1983), many researchers try to combine 
the analysis of apologies as illocutionary acts with that of 
apologies as social acts. One of the pioneers in this field is Owen 
(1983), who not only presents an extensive research of apologies, 
but also attempts to combine the two perspectives of analyzing 
apologies: apologies as illocutionary acts and apologies as social 
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acts. Adopting Goffman's analysis of apologies as remedial moves, 
Owen classifies types of primary remedial moves of apologies in 
English, and describes the dialogic structure in which they are 
located. Owen also describes these remedial moves as illocutionary 
acts, adopting the analyses in Searle (1969, 1979), in particular, 
Searle's concept of indirect speech acts.
 In Searle (1979), indirect speech acts are explained as 
illocutionary acts performed by way of performing another 
illocutionary act. Searle explains the utterance “I am sorry I did 
it” as an indirect speech act of apologizing, which is performed 
indirectly by way of asserting the satisfaction of the sincerity 
condition for the act: the speaker is sorry (1979: 54). Following 
Searle, Owen (1983) describes indirect speech acts of apologizing 
which are obtained by asserting for the satisfaction of each of 
the four felicity conditions, i.e., the propositional content rule, the 
preparatory rule, the sincerity rule, and the essential rule. She 
concludes that the existence of a natural class of indirect speech 
acts of apologizing is doubtful (121-126), which is often taken as 
general skepticism about specifying a class of sentences used to 
perform a particular illocutionary act indirectly (Levinson 1983).
2. A revised model of illocutionary acts
In Section 1 different definitions of apologies are provided, and 
some attempts to combine the analysis of apologies as illocutionary 
acts and that of apologies as social acts are introduced. In the 
present section, I propose a framework of illocutionary acts in 
which aspects of apologies as social acts are explained. Unlike 
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Owen (1983), I do this by developing Austin's (1962) idea of 
illocutionary acts rather than Searle's (1969, 1979).  
2.1. Illocutionary acts of apologizing
As is explained in the former section, within Austin's (1962) 
classification of illocutionary forces/acts, the act of apologizing is 
explained as a behabitive type, which is to react, or assume/express 
attitudes. More specifically, it is the speaker's act of reacting to her 
past conduct, and assuming or expressing an attitude of regret for 
it, while committing herself to avoiding the conduct. How can the 
act of apologizing be performed? How can the speaker assume an 
attitude of regret in saying an utterance? Austin dose not explain 
clearly how the speaker performs an illocutionary act, while 
Searle and other speech act theorists (Searle 1969, 1976, 1979, 1983, 
1989[2002], Searle and Vanderveken 1985, and Bach and Harnish 
1979) explain this in terms of the speaker's intention. Therefore we 
have to retrieve the idea Austin embedded in his arguments.
 At the very beginning Austin (1962) introduces the distinction 
between performatives and constatives: in uttering a performative, 
the speaker performs an action, while in uttering a constative, 
she describes or reports a certain event or circumstance. How 
can the speaker perform, say, an act of apologizing in uttering 
a performative, “I apologize”? What is so unique about uttering 
performatives? The uniqueness seems to reside in the fact that 
the speaker specifies what she is doing in the utterance while 
saying the very utterance. What is it for the speaker to specify 
what she does in saying the utterance? The speaker might be 
making a move of assigning a certain value to the utterance as its 
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(illocutionary) force. In uttering “I apologize”, the speaker makes a 
move of assigning the value of apologizing to the utterance as its 
(illocutionary) force; while saying something, the speaker specifies 
that it is apologizing. In uttering a performative, by which the act 
that the speaker performs in the utterance is specified, the speaker 
openly or publicly assigns a particular value to the present 
utterance.
 If I am right about the analysis of the nature of performatives, 
the theory of performatives can easily be extended to that of 
illocutionary acts, as is done by Austin (1962) himself. To perform 
an illocutionary act is generally to assign a certain value to the 
utterance as its illocutionary force, and, when an illocutionary 
act is performed by a performative, a value is explicitly specified 
and assigned to the utterance as its illocutionary force, through 
the specification of the act that the speaker performs in the 
utterance. In saying an utterance such as “I'm sorry”, “I blame 
myself”, and “It was my fault”, the speaker generally indicates 
the act of apologizing, and assigns the value of apologizing to the 
utterance as its illocutionary force. In uttering the performative 
“I apologize”, on the other hand, the speaker specifies the act that 
she performs in the utterance as the act of apologizing, and, in 
doing so, she assigns the value of apologizing to the utterance as 
its illocutionary force.
 How is the illocutionary force of an utterance evaluated and 
given a particular value? Let us examine Austin's (1962) felicity 
conditions. Austin first specifies them as the conditions under 
which the speaker felicitously performs an act in uttering a 
performative. If, as is claimed, to perform an illocutionary act by 
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means of a performative utterance is to specify the illocutionary 
force of an utterance, and to assign a value to it openly or 
publicly, the conditions under which performatives are felicitously 
performed show how illocutionary forces are specified and their 
values are assigned. That is, since illocutionary acts performed by 
performatives become infelicitous when the specified illocutionary 
forces are not the forces of the utterances, and, therefore, the 
assigned values cannot be given to the utterances, the ways 
illocutionary acts become felicitous or infelicitous indicate how the 
illocutionary forces of the utterances are evaluated.
 If so, then the felicity conditions do not only show how 
the values of illocutionary forces of performative utterances 
are determined, but how the values of illocutionary forces of 
utterances in general are determined. This matches Austin's 
interpretation of the felicity conditions: they are, against common 
assumptions, conditions for illocutionary acts in general4. In the 
following section, Austin's felicity conditions are reexamined to 
find out the elements in terms of which values of the illocutionary 
forces of utterances, such as apologizing, are determined.
2.3 Austin's felicity conditions
Before we start reexamining the felicity conditions, let us specify 
terminology to clarify the complexity of the speaker, the hearer, 
and the speech situation, which was suggested in section 1.2.1.
 When the speaker performs a particular illocutionary act, 
which is explained, within the proposed theoretical framework, 
as an act of assigning a particular value to the illocutionary 
force of the present utterance, the speaker identifies herself as a 
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performer of the illocutionary act. The term addresser is used for 
the performer of the illocutionary act. The hearer is a particular 
person to whom the speaker utters something. When the speaker 
performs a particular illocutionary act, she identifies the hearer 
as a receiver of the illocutionary act. The term addressee is used 
for the receiver of the illocutionary act. When the speaker and the 
hearer communicate, they are in a particular situation. When the 
speaker performs a particular illocutionary act, she identifies the 
circumstances of the present speech situation as the situation of 
the illocutionary act. The term context is used for the situation 
of the illocutionary act. For example, when the speaker performs 
the illocutionary act of apologizing in uttering the performative 
utterance “I apologize” or a non-performative utterance, say, “It 
was my fault”, the speaker identifies herself as the addresser of 
apologizing, the hearer as the addressee to whom apologizing is 
made, and the circumstances of the present speech situation as the 
context of apologizing.
 Let us start with Austin's felicity conditions (A.1) and (A.2):
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure 
having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to 
include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in 
certain circumstances, and further, 
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case 
must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular 
procedure invoked. (Austin 1962: 14-15)
The felicity condition (A.1) shows that the value of the 
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illocutionary force of an utterance is specified with a certain effect, 
which is produced conventionally by the utterance of a particular 
addresser to a particular addressee in a particular context. The 
felicity condition (A.2) shows that the value of the illocutionary 
force of an utterance is also specified by a particular speaker, a 
particular hearer, and the particular circumstances of the present 
speech situation. That is, to specify the value of the illocutionary 
force of an utterance as, say, apologizing, is to say the utterance 
as the addresser of apologizing, who reacts to her past conduct, 
expresses/assumes regret for it, asks the addressee for forgiveness, 
and commits herself to avoiding the conduct. It is also to say 
the utterance to the hearer as the addressee of apologizing, who 
suffered/suffers from the speaker's past conduct, and is asked for 
forgiveness. It is, furthermore, to say the utterance in the speech 
situation of the context of apologizing, where the speaker's past 
offence is foregrounded. That is, the value of the illocutionary 
force of an utterance is specified in terms of the conventional 
effect produced by the utterance that the speaker says as a 
specified addresser, to the hearer as a specified addressee, in the 
speech situation as a specified context.
 Next let us discuss Austin's felicity conditions (B.1) and (B.2):
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both 
correctly and 
(B.2) completely. (Austin 1962: 14-15)
Usually these conditions are not given any significance. This is 
because felicity conditions (A.1) and (A.2) specify there being 
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certain persons and circumstances for an illocutionary act to be 
successfully performed, and those persons and their actions do not 
have to be specified again by separate felicity conditions. However, 
if the speaker is theoretically separated from the addresser, or the 
hearer is from the addressee, there are enough reasons for positing 
felicity conditions (B.1) and (B.2). As we explained above, felicity 
conditions (A.1) and (A.2) specify, to assign a particular value 
to the utterance as its illocutionary force, what addresser the 
speaker has to be, and what addressee the hearer has to be. These 
conditions do not specify how the speaker and the hearer have to 
act/behave. Even though there are conventions which specify the 
effect of an utterance, and persons and circumstances for the effect 
to be brought about, a particular instance of assigning a value 
to the illocutionary force of the utterance does not occur unless 
particular persons, the present speaker and the present hearer, 
act/behave in a certain way. The speaker always has a choice to 
assign a different value to the illocutionary force of the utterance, 
or not to perform any illocutionary act at all. The hearer also has 
a choice not to acknowledge the value even though the speaker 
goes through the procedure of assigning the value according to 
the convention. Assigning a value also fails when the speaker says 
a wrong thing as a slip of the tongue, or the hearer does not hear 
what the speaker says, and, therefore, does not react to it. That is, 
the value of the illocutionary force of an utterance is specified in 
terms of the speaker's actual action of saying the utterance, which 
exhibits her commitment, and the hearer's reaction to it, which 
exhibits his involvement.
 Let us finally examine felicity conditions (Γ.1) and (Γ.2):
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(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use 
by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the 
inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of 
any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking 
the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, 
and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, 
and further
(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. 
(Austin 1962: 15)
These conditions specify that the speaker's thoughts/feelings and 
intentions for a future action should be identical with those of the 
addresser she says the present utterance as. A certain value, say, 
apologizing, can be given to the illocutionary act of an utterance 
only when the speaker is sorry for her past conduct, and has 
an intention to avoid the conduct in the future. The speaker's 
thoughts/feelings and intentions for a future action cannot be 
known for sure, but the presence or absence of these thoughts/
feelings and intentions is often known from the way she says the 
utterance, her non-verbal behaviour, and even the knowledge of 
the speaker's character or her personal history. This explains the 
reason why an angry customer gets angrier when a telephone 
operator says “I'm sorry” just as a formality, or a politician's 
apologizing to a political opponent is rejected: the speaker is not 
sorry, or is not sorry enough to be the addresser of apologizing.
 Let us summarize the analyses so far. Austin's felicity 
conditions in (A) show that the value of the illocutionary force 
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of an utterance is specified in terms of the conventional effect 
produced by the utterance that the speaker says as a specified 
addresser, to the hearer as a specified addressee, in the speech 
situation as a specified context. Austin's felicity conditions in (B) 
show that the value of the illocutionary force of an utterance is 
specified in terms of the speaker's action of saying the utterance, 
which exhibits her commitment, and the hearer's reaction to it, 
which exhibits his involvement. Austin's felicity conditions in (Γ) 
show that the value of the illocutionary force of an utterance is 
specified in terms of the speaker's thoughts/feelings and intentions 
for a future action as a specified addresser.
2.4 Illocutionary acts as social acts
If the proposed analyses of the illocutionary force of an utterance 
are correct, specifying the value of the illocutionary force of an 
utterance by means of a performative utterance is a significant 
move in communication, and can put the communication or 
the speaker's power of managing the communication at risk. 
In specifying the value by means of a performative utterance, 
the speaker specifies so many aspects of the communication 
without talking about them. In saying “I apologize”, the speaker 
specifies herself as the addresser of apologizing, the hearer as the 
addressee of apologizing, and the speech situation as a context 
of apologizing, while indicating an object to apologize for, and 
invites the hearer to accept this specification of the communicative 
aspects of the present speech situation. In saying “I apologize”, 
the speaker also exhibits her commitment as the addresser of 
apologizing, and requests the hearer's involvement as the addressee 
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to whom apologizing is made. Furthermore, the speaker exhibits 
her thoughts/feelings and her commitment for a future action 
without saying so.
 It is no wonder that performatives are not often used except 
in formal situations. Unless they are in formal situations where 
the speaker is more or less specified as a certain addresser, the 
hearer as a certain addressee, and the situations as a certain 
context, people do not want to openly specify many aspects of the 
communication, exhibit their commitments, request the hearer's 
involvement, and express their thoughts/feelings and commitments. 
Communication is usually a more careful endeavour to negotiate 
(i) the ways in which conversation participants address each 
other, and the context in which they are in, (ii) the degrees of 
the commitment/involvement requested/expected by them, and 
(iii) the expression of thoughts, feelings, and intentions expected/
requested by them.
 How does the speaker assign a value to the illocutionary 
force of the utterance by a non-performative means? Since the 
illocutionary force of the utterance is evaluated in terms of (i) the 
effect of the utterance, which is brought about by the utterance 
of the speaker as a certain addresser, to the hearer as a certain 
addressee, in the speech situation of a certain context, (ii) the 
speaker's commitment and the hearer's involvement, and (iii) 
the exhibition of speaker's thoughts, feelings, and intentions, it is 
quite likely that non-performatives utterance which indicate these 
elements are used.
 So-called apology strategies (Fraser 1981, Olshtain and Cohen 
1983, Owen 1983, Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1984, Blum-Kulka et al 
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1989, Trosberg 1987) seem to show strategies of assigning the value 
of apologizing as the illocutionary force of an utterance by non-
performative means. Fraser (1981: 263), for example, describes nine 
strategies as follows:
(1) announcing that you are apologizing,
(2) stating one's obligation to apologize,
(3) offering to apologize,
(4) requesting the hearer to accept an apology, 
(5) expressing regret for the offence, 
(6) requesting forgiveness for the offense, 
(7) acknowledging responsibility for the offending act,
(8) promising forbearance from a similar offending act,
(9) offering redress.
In strategy (1), (2), (3), (5), and (7), the speaker assigns the 
value of apologizing to the illocutionary force of an utterance 
by showing that she is the addresser of apologizing: she is 
apologizing, is offering to apologize, has an obligation to apologize, 
regrets for the offence, or is responsible for the offending act. In 
strategy (4) and (6), the speaker does so by inviting the hearer 
to be the addressee to whom apologizing is made: the hearer is 
requested to accept an apology or forgive the offense. In strategy 
(8) and (9) the speaker does so by exhibiting her intention as that 
of the addresser of apologizing: she is promising forbearance from 
a similar act, or is offering redress.
 Olshtain and Cohen limit the number of apology strategies to 
five: “an expression of an apology”, “an explanation or account of 
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the situation”, “an acknowledgment of responsibility”, “an offer 
of repair”, and “a promise of forbearance”(1983: 22).  They can 
be analyzed in a similar fashion as non-performative means of 
assigning the value of apologizing to the illocutionary force of an 
utterance.
 There seem to be culture-specific preferences for what 
addresser the speaker identifies herself as, and what addressee the 
speaker regards the hearer as. Mey (2001) provides an example of 
a conversation in Japanese in which a customer utters “Sumimasen” 
(“I'm sorry”) to a clerk for an unpaid service, and says “[the 
expression of apology] appears unexpectedly at a point where we 
in English assume an expression of gratitude to be in order, such 
as ‘Thanks a lot'”(2001: 263). This shows that the speaker has 
a choice as to which addresser she assumes, i.e., the addresser of 
apologizing, who apologizes for causing trouble for the clerk, or 
the addresser of thanking, who thanks for an extra service from 
the clerk. There seems to be preference, in Japanese culture, for 
saying an utterance as the addresser of apologizing in this type of 
situation.
 There also seem to be culture-specific preferences for how the 
speaker specifies the illocutionary force of an utterance in given 
cases. The extended research on apologies from a cross-cultural 
perspective done by Blum-Kulka et al (1989) and Olshtain (1989) 
can be reanalyzed as the issues of which aspect/aspects of the 
utterance—(i) the effect of the utterance, and an addresser, an 
addressee, and a context, (ii) the speaker's commitment and the 
hearer's involvement, or (iii) the exhibition of speaker's thoughts, 
feelings, and intentions—the speaker indicates in assigning the 
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value of apologizing in given cases. Such analyses will reveal not 
only cultural preferences, but also culturally specific patterns of 
building social relationships, which are explained as reasons for 
those preferences.
 The minute analyses of the addresser, the addressee, and the 
context specified by the value of apologizing as well as those 
of the aspect/aspects of the utterance the speaker indicates in 
assigning a value to the illocutionary force of the utterance may 
contribute to the clarification of politeness and gender issues. This 
is because the issues in question seem to be the social relation 
between the speaker and the hearer, or men and women, which 
is specified or indicated by way of the social relation between 
the addresser and the addressee. I will just mention the analyses 
of the issues of politeness and gender in the literature, which the 
proposed theory should incorporate.
 Brown (1980) and Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) develop 
a theory of politeness in which communication is explained as 
avoiding face-threatening acts; people apologize for imposition as a 
negative-politeness strategy.
 Although the face-saving view is influential, there are other 
views of politeness, which are explained by Fraser (1990) as 
the social-norm view, the conversational-maxim view adopted by 
Lakoff (1973) and Leech (1983), and the conversational-contract 
view adopted by Fraser (1975, 1990) and Fraser and Nolen (1981). 
Brown and Levinson's claim of the universality of the concepts of 
negative and positive face is criticized by researchers of politeness 
in non-Western cultures. They claim Brown and Levinson's model 
does not address adequately communicative behaviours in non-
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Western cultures, where the primary interactional focus in not 
upon individualism but upon group identity (Matsumoto 1988, 1989, 
Ide 1989, Bharuthram 2003)5 or where politeness signals different 
moral meaning or normative values (Bergman and Kasper 1993, 
Gu 1990, Nwoye 1992, Mao 1994)6.  There is also an issue of degrees 
of politeness. Brown and Levinson (1987) claim that the higher 
the level of indirectness, the greater the degree of politeness, but 
this does not apply to the case of apologies (Holmes 1990b). A 
gender issue of apologizing, i.e., how men and women use apology 
strategies, is thoroughly discussed by Holmes (1986, 1988, 1989, 
1990a, 1993, 1995) and Meyerhoff (1999, 2000, 2003). 
3. Conclusion
Apologies as illocutionary and social acts are explained in the 
proposed theoretical framework, in which the illocutionary act 
is explained as the speaker's move of assigning a value to the 
illocutionary force of the utterance; in doing so, the speaker 
identifies herself as a certain addresser, the hearer as a certain 
addressee, and the present speech situation as a certain context. 
The different aspects of the utterance are clarified as the 
elements in terms of which a value as the illocutionary force of 
the utterance is specified. Accordingly, the act of apologizing 
is explained as the speaker's assigning the value of apologizing 
to the illocutionary force of an utterance, which is specified as 
(i) the effect of the utterance, and an addresser, an addressee, 
and a context, (ii) the speaker's commitment and the hearer's 
involvement, and (iii) the exhibition of speaker's thoughts, 
feelings, and intentions. Social aspects of the act of apologizing are 
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explained in terms of (i) the social aspect of the speaker's move 
of assigning the value of apologizing, and (ii) the social relation 
between the speaker and the hearer which is specified or indicated 
by the social relation between the addresser and the addressee. 
The latter can be extended to explain the issues of politeness and 
gender. 
 1Throughout the present paper I refer to the speaker as “she/
her” and the hearer as “he/him”. There is, however, no gender 
implication involved in this usage.
 2The act of apologizing is not included in the examples of 
illocutionary acts specified by these four rules (Searle 1969: 66-67). 
However, the extension of these analyses to different illocutionary 
acts, such as apologizing, seems to be straightforward.
 3Bach (2007) makes a similar point.
 4See Sbisa¥ (2007: 464) for this argument.
 5See Wierzbicka (1991) for general arguments of language- or 
culture-specificity of illocutionary acts. 
 6See also Jenney and Arndt (1993), Watts (2003), and Watts et 
al. (1992).
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